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If the sounding of the "all clear" on the swine fever epidemic between Christmas and the New year was a cause for celebration for the pig industry and for Whitehall, the same could not be said for Westminister. Technically the epidemic was handled well. Politically it was a disaster. 530 words

The industry can take pride in having steered a steady course under extremely difficult conditions. This feat was that much more commendable having followed two years of disastrous prices which had left the industry in a particularly fragile state.

The State Veterinary Service can almost certainly take credit for limiting the number case to just 16 farms, with about 250,000 pigs being slaughtered for one reason or another. The outbreak was confined to a relatively small three-county area and to about five months of restricted movement.

While direct comparisons may not be entirely relevant the 1997-98 Dutch outbreak involved 11 million pigs, half of the total Dutch pig population. With pigs thicker on the ground in Holland the challenge was greater but against this the Dutch did not have to contend with outdoor production units.

While the UK had been free of swine fever for 14 years, the vets knew what they were dealing from both from previous UK and more recent European experience.

If most of the country avoided the pain, the same could not be said of pig producers in the infection area. And it is here that the Westminister government failed in the eyes of all but the most callous observer.

Of the quarter of a million pigs lost only about 40,000 were on the 16 farms where swine fever was diagnosed. Another 34,000 were slaughtered on farms with dangerous contact with the 16 infected farms. But almost three quarters of the casualties appear to have been destroyed for animal welfare reasons, with farmers receiving minimal compensation.

The animal welfare issue arose solely because the restrictions on movement of pigs necessary to confine the outbreak. It was therefore almost as much part of the control program as the slaughter of infected and dangerous contact herds.

That there was a problem was recognized early, within a couple of weeks of the first outbreak, but grudgingly with a token program covering only disposal costs. Only after three months and when the media exposed the welfare aspects, and as a result the issue became one of concern to the electorate at large, did the government show interest.

From a farmer's standpoint the behavior of government appeared almost vindictive. In the first place the outbreak of swine fever was certainly not the fault of farmers but very probably the failure of government in terms of health restrictions on imports. Those who contracted the disease received something close to full compensation. But those who were caught in restricted movement zones and unable to market healthy pigs were expected to fend for themselves.

The government was fortunate that pig producers are a law-abiding group. But it was clearly irresponsible for it to have gambled on this, just as it would be irresponsible to leave a parked car unlocked in Westminister. It will not be soon forgotten by the pig industry.

January 22, 2001