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After years of sweeping evidence under the rug, or pretending it was a challenge for Britain alone, the major beef producing member states of the European Union are having to face reality of low level but widespread BSE. The long-standing challenge for politicians was that their farm and food industry constituents wanted to avoid the issue. Hence, the culture of denial in the face of public warnings from the mainstream scientific community, even including those from the European Commission. The ability of the Germans to hide from the issue has been outstanding. Over 12 years and until very recently Germany did not report a single case of BSE, apart from six cases of BSE in animals imported from Britain. With this record the Germans were able steadfastly to deny that they were at risk. Even a EU analysis, published last May, which noted of Germany "it is likely that BSE is currently present in the domestic cattle population," appeared to do little to dent their confidence. In late November, and embarrassingly for the Germans, the first blot on their copy book was a cow that had been exported to the mid-Atlantic Azores Islands. Immediately following this the Germans found several cases in various parts of their country. The tally two months later stands at 25. The French were less successful in keeping the issue out of sight. A low but increasing incidence has been apparent for some years. It attracted a EU veterinary mission to France in 1999 which was critical of a number of elements of French BSE control and with diplomatic understatement noted ''under-reporting cannot be excluded.'' Not until a French programme of random testing of sick cattle, possibly at the insistence of the Agence Francaise de Security Sanitaire des Aliments - the new food safety agency, did the issue turn sour. Last autumn these random tests were turning up more cases than the voluntary reporting process. The implication was that the incidence of BSE in France was many times that being reported with the probability that beef from unreported cases ended up in the food chain. It was, however, not this, but specific news that beef, probably uninfected, from a BSE implicated herd caused the media to pick up on BSE. The supermarket chain involved cleared its shelves of beef and it was probably this rather dramatic action that sensitized French consumers. Both the French and German outbreaks will almost certainly be contained at levels much below of those in the UK ten years ago. But in the important political arena they have out blundered the British. If the response of the British government was hesitant and appeared evasive, it can be claimed it was faced with a great deal of uncertainty, particularly in the early stages of the epidemic when nothing was known of the disease. The French and German governments, however, not only had the benefit of the British research and experience and the advice of the European Commission, but must have been aware of the political ordeal suffered by the British government. The emergence of the European epidemic which now includes Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Belgium in addition to France and Germany comes at an unfortunate time for Britain. Just as it has reached the stage where it can start justifying the relaxation of controls and allowing more beef into food markets, the rest of Europe is heading in the other direction. And just as some European states were loath to accept they were at risk, they will be equally unwilling to accept that Britain is increasingly less at risk. The challenge for Britain is, of course, that BSE decisions will continue to be driven largely by politics. Again, as it was when the epidemic broke more than ten years ago, Britain finds itself as a minority of one in Brussels on the issue. It will be a long hard slog to get any acceptance for the lifting of BSE restrictions. February 6, 2001 top of pageMaintained by:David Walker . Copyright © 2001. David Walker. Copyright & Disclaimer Information. Last Revised/Reviewed: 010206 |