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The politics of BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), or mad cow disease, which is widely believed to cause variant CJD (Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease), a rare but fatal human disease, provide, and continue to provide, as much interest as the disease itself. Many of the mistakes made in Britain a decade ago are now being repeated elsewhere in Europe with predictable results. (910 words)

After years of sweeping evidence under the rug, or pretending it was a challenge for Britain alone, Britain's partners in the European Union are having to face reality of low levels of, but widespread, BSE.

The long-standing challenge for politicians has been that their farm and food industry constituents wanted to avoid the issue. Hence, there was a culture of denial in the face of public warnings from the mainstream scientific community, even including those from the European Commission.

The ability of the Germans in particular to hide from the issue has been outstanding. Over 12 years and until very recently Germany did not report a single case of BSE, except for six animals imported from Britain. And these exceptions might seem to prove the rule that German cattle were free of BSE.

With this record the Germans were able steadfastly to deny that they were at risk. Even a EU risk analysis, published last May, which noted of Germany "it is likely that BSE is currently present in the domestic cattle population," appeared to do little to erode their confidence.

In late November, and embarrassingly for the Germans, the first blot on the copy book was BSE in a German cow exported to the mid-Atlantic Azores islands. Several cases came to light in various parts of Germany within days. The tally two months later stands at 25.

A low but increasing incidence of BSE in France in recent years indicated that the French were less thorough than their neighbour. It attracted a EU veterinary mission in 1999 which was critical of a number of elements of French BSE control and with diplomatic understatement noted "under reporting cannot be excluded."

Not until a French program of random testing of sick cattle started last autumn turning up more cases than the voluntary reporting process did the situation turn sour. The implication was that the incidence of BSE in France was many times that being reported, and that beef from the unreported cases probably ended up in the food chain.

It was not this, but specific news of beef, probably uninfected, from a BSE implicated herd reaching retail counters and the dramatic action of the supermarket which cleared its shelves of beef, that sensitized French media and consumers.

Both the French and German outbreaks will almost certainly be contained at levels much below of those in the UK ten years ago. But in the important political arena they have out blundered the British.

If the response of the British government was hesitant and appeared to be evasive, it can claim it was faced with a great deal of uncertainty. This was particularly so in the early stages of the epidemic when next to nothing was known of the disease.

The French and German governments, however, not only had the benefit of the British research and experience and the advice of the European Commission, but must have been aware of the political ordeal suffered by the British government.

Consumers have, understandably, been unforgiving. Demand for European beef has been such that it is cheaper to burn it than attempt to sell it at knock down prices on the international markets.

Initially marketing control measures allowed for beef from animals over 30-months, the youngest age at which symptoms start to develop, to be sold in food channels if tested for BSE. But as even the EU's agricultural budget looks to be stretched to breaking, it is looking increasingly at the disposal option. As even this is beginning to appear unworkable, the much maligned Herod scheme used for some time in the UK where calves were bought off the market for disposal is being considered.

Member states' governments are, of course, also doing what they can individually to reestablish confidence in beef. A popular strategy seems to be to implement some measure more stringent than British controls and then spin around the specific item.

For instance France has banned the sale of beef on the bone, a measure implemented in Britain for several years but dropped when it was assessed to have little food safety benefit. The German gambit is to lower the 30-month barrier to 24 months, as cattle have been known to develop symptoms at this lower age.

Interestingly Britain is just now planning to raise its 30-month limit. As Britain has had virtually no BSE cases in cattle born since its 1996 ban on feeding meat and bone, it had no cases of BSE in animals less than 50 months in 2000. And simple math suggests it would be reasonable to expect the lower age limit to rise to 62 months in 2001.

To raise the 30-month barrier Britain will require EU approval. As EU member states have been slow to acknowledge their BSE liability and give up the competitive advantage a BSE-free status provides, they will likely be reluctant to see Britain moving towards that goal.

Improved relations might be expected now that Europe is in the same BSE boat as Britain. But how well will any British attempt to leave the boat be taken?

February 8, 2001