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Having been subject to considerable publicity during the British foot and mouth outbreak, vaccination is widely seen as an alternative to conventional slaughter policy despite contrary scientific opinion. Only the development of improved vaccination techniques will eliminate the risk in response to political pressures of its inappropriate use in the future (880 words).

The end of the 2001 British foot and mouth disease outbreak is finally in sight, although it may be tempting fate to suggest this. Reports of new cases are now down to just a handful each week and then only in two areas in northern England. There have been suspected outbreaks elsewhere, but thankfully none of these have been confirmed.

Time for consideration of more than the immediate future is, therefore, at hand.

The industry's very natural priority is to see a proper investigation of how the outbreak was handled. In a political context it is seen as important to establish that the horrendous costs were the result of poor administration rather than ongoing support for the livestock industry.

The issue of vaccination, however, may cast a longer shadow than the size and cost of the outbreak. Judging from the absence of any serious attempt by the British government to improve national bio-security to preclude meat imports from areas where the disease is endemic, the government seems to be very nonchalant about costs.

The shortcomings of vaccination for foot and mouth are not well understood by the public, even though the scientific community has attempted to explain this.

Most people would like to believe that vaccination would work, when slaughter with disposal by burying or burning on open pyres is the option. And human experience of vaccination is generally very positive where it is practised.

The issue was also complicated by the consideration of vaccination in a very specific circumstance which the public undoubtedly construed as approval for its use in a general context. The successful use of vaccination by the Dutch in circumstances very different from those faced in Britain may have further confused the public.

The major challenge with vaccination is distinguishing between healthy and infected animals once they have been vaccinated. It is never possible to be certain that a vaccinated animal was not incubating foot and mouth when vaccinated or was infected after vaccination and before immunity is built up. Such animals may be infectious.

The international community is as a result not prepared to accord foot and mouth free status to countries with active vaccination programmes. This status only follows once vaccination ceases and enough time has elapsed without the incidence of foot and mouth in unvaccinated stock.

Mass vaccination would, therefore, only be considered by a country where a foot and mouth outbreak developed into epidemic, or the disease was endemic.

Buffer zone vaccination to create a fire break of immune animals is an option provided all stock that could have been infected at the time of vaccination are identified and culled. This allows for more orderly disposal of potentially infected animals and less traffic at the time of the outbreak which can, of course, result in the spread of the disease.

The Netherlands was very successful this spring in containing and eliminating foot and mouth in this way. The Dutch recognized that their human population density was too high to consider burning livestock in the open and water tables are too high for burying.

They clearly used the month between the outbreak in Britain and their first case, which was promptly identified, effectively. Necessary European Union approval for their vaccination programme was obtained in a few days.

The Dutch vaccinated all animals within 10 km of the original outbreak promptly and culled and rendered them all in a matter of months. While the number of animals lost was relatively small, it was five times that in Britain on a per infected farm basis.

If the Dutch outbreak had not been contained, however, the implications of attempting control by vaccination would have been more devastating than the British outbreak.

The disastrous start to the British outbreak, 25 confirmed cases within a week separated by as much as 300 miles, may have precluded consideration of buffer zone vaccination even if Britain was prepared or had had time to prepare for this.

A limited programme for vaccination of housed cattle not at immediate risk but in the worst effected region of Britain, was proposed by the government but rejected by the industry as the restriction necessary for its approval were too onerous.

A conference of member states of the European Union on vaccination is to be held later this year. While it can be expected to result in definitive and scientifically sound recommendations on vaccination policy, whether these will count for much if and when there is another outbreak is open to question.

Clear recommendations from the Northumberland Commission following the 1967 British foot and mouth outbreak were ignored until too late at the start of this year's outbreak. These were on much less emotive issues than vaccination.

Wherever the next outbreak occurs, there will surely be considerable pressure to use vaccination regardless of its suitability for the situation. The best hope that it will be used appropriately is technological development to eliminate current short comings.

October 1, 2001