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A consensus is emerging that the mistakes with the recent British foot and mouth outbreak would have been avoided if recommendations made after the 1967 outbreak had been promptly implemented. The unasked question is why was there a delay. (600 words)

Six months after the last case of foot and mouth disease in Britain the countryside is beginning to return to normal. Because of horrendous damage done by the outbreak which resulted in the slaughter of 4.2 million head of livestock on more than 10,000 farms, the outrage of many of those effected has not yet abated. For this reason the outbreak is still very much alive in a political sense.

While the national government has chosen not to hold a public inquiry into the outbreak, just about everybody else, from local governments to farm organizations to the European Parliament, is seeking the truth.

The findings of these inquiries which have been completed have been relatively consistent. In general terms they have blamed the government for failing to control the very probable source - imported infected meat, for not being prepared and for failing to act promptly and effectively when the outbreak took hold.

The government has, in fact, admitted as much. The junior minister for food and farming, Lord Whitty, in a government press release stated, "Undoubtedly there are some things that with hindsight we would do differently or better." In view of the Prime Minister having taken overall responsible for control of the outbreak this is probably as much as can be expected.

But reference to "hindsight" was unfortunate. In contrast to the BSE, mad cow disease, outbreak more than a decade earlier, foot and mouth is understood. Very clear recommendations on handling further outbreaks were made in the often quoted Northumberland Report of a British government inquiry following the last major outbreak in 1967.

The relevance of these recommendations became apparent when the government eventually decided to implement them, the most critical of which was the use of the army to ensure that infected animals were slaughtered and disposed of promptly, with the outbreak coming under control.

The unasked question is not about what mistakes were made but why they were made. Or more precisely why the Northumberland Report recommendations were ignored for so long. And in view of the Prime Minister’s role it is not an answer that will be easy to come by, as every effort will be made to avoid the question being asked in an appropriate forum.

That forum is a public inquiry, with the authority to summons who ever it chooses to give evidence.

Attempts, in the form of a Judicial Review, are being made to bring this about. The judicial review in essence asks whether the government acted within the law in refusing a public inquiry. A High Court has found in favour of the government but its decision may be appealed to the House of Lords and the European Court of Justice.

The case for a public inquiry related to access to information and associated civil rights issues. The government claims a public inquiry would be time consuming and do little more than line the pockets of the lawyer. That it is very eager to avoid a public inquiry is evident from the witness of the Attorney General at the judicial review.

Attempting to force a public inquiry is undoubtedly considered politically vindictive by some, but there is an important message for politician to learn from the outbreak. It is simply that decisions should have been made on technical grounds and not by politicians influenced by such issues as the scheduling elections and the need to be viewed as loving of animals.

A suitable public grilling of the Prime Minister would provide a lesson to politicians not to involve themselves too closely in such technical matters as disease control in the future.

April 15, 2002